Structural adjustment policies in Europe underscore the lack of sovereignty and responsibility of nation-states towards the wellbeing of their citizens. As a result, in popular mobilizations arguments of inequality and injustice, expressed in a demand for dignity, are intertwined. The article explores this shift away from older arguments of exploitation and domination. Using ethnographic material from an industrial town in
In Europe incomes are dwindling and basic public provisioning of education and health services is diminishing, producing material precariousness and emotional anxiety in large sectors of the population. Structural adjustment policies are underscoring the lack of sovereignty and responsibility of nation-states towards the wellbeing of their citizens.
In this context, people are starting to organize, to protest and act in an attempt to change the world they live in. Very salient in all present-day mobilizations are the intertwined arguments of inequality and injustice, and the widespread demand for respect and dignity. I will explore what this shift away from older arguments of exploitation and domination means for the pedagogies of social change.
Present-day protests in Spain generally address the state's failure to secure a decent livelihood for its citizens, that is, the failure to protect and provide security across generations. The generational aspect points to the larger framework of social reproduction, where the "lack of a future" 1 expresses a systemic breakdown perceived in everyday life and becomes the pressing force behind the protests. The argument behind mobilizations is that the state fails citizens because it has become completely subservient to capitalist interests and especially to financial, speculative forms of accumulation, a rationalization that implicitly condemns forms of wealth accumulation through monopoly rent privilege. Collusion between political and economic elites is denounced and rejected as corruption, and impunity for these elites' illegal behaviour adds insult to injury while it negates the basic tenet of liberal democracy, i.e. equality of citizens before the Law. Increasingly salient are appeals to recover "national sovereignty" in the face of austerity policies that are perceived as imposed from without by powerful trans-territorial institutions such as the infamous Troika 2 . The perception that the institutions supporting and organizing capitalist accumulation and directly 2 responsible for the structure of livelihood opportunities are beyond national democratic control is acute. It is intensified by the certainty that democratically elected parliaments are not held responsible vis-à-vis the citizenry but vis-à-vis non-elected transnational institutions that support capitalist accumulation or surplus extraction.
Using ethnographic material from an industrial town in Galicia, I will analyze mobilizations that have emerged after the 2008 crisis, trying to understand what grievances and objectives pull people together. The relationship of these movements with the memories of past practices of struggle will be related to present-day forms of wealth accumulation and to how ordinary people interpret them. I will focus on the convergence of traditional union activism with other collective forms of mobilization in order to show how they are increasingly converging around a call for dignity, basically a claim to recognition and social worth (Fraser 1995 (Fraser , 2001 ). The various modes of resistance, protest and mobilization hark back to a local tradition of struggle in terms of continuity or rupture as they develop new subjectivities and define the social objectives of the future.
The growth of unemployment and precarisation have transformed subjectivities in the most intimate ways, as people are forced to rely on personalized or institutional forms of dependency that the ideology of autonomy and self-reliance of the neoliberal model had discredited. This systematic humiliation has produced a struggle to change the moral frameworks in which making a life acquires value and meaning (Narotzky and Besnier 2014) while also creating conditions of possibility for obtaining basic resources while regaining dignity. My hypothesis is that a "moral economy" framework is superseding the framework primarily based on "political economy" that dominated in the recent past as the central motivation for workers' struggles. As the ethnography shows, however, there is no clear-cut distinction between moral and politico-economic 3 arguments. Rather there is a tangle that gets increasingly expressed in moral terms and explicitly embedded in a discourse that underlines the failure of the state to protect and care for its citizens. This affective discourse replaces the classical structural pedagogy of socialism with an intuitive and spontaneous feeling of suffering inflicted by "the system" which includes the failure of the institutions (parties, unions) that were directly in charge of protecting and promoting working people's wellbeing. The structures of feeling that mobilize people in Ferrol express the politico-economic production of an increasingly large surplus population (Smith 2011; Sider 1996; Li 2009) 
The context of mobilizations
The mobilizations I will discuss emerged in the period immediately following the 2008 crisis and are ongoing. The first one is the expression of social networks of support including the reactivation of kinship networks and other forms of solidarity circulating food and clothing and giving support against house eviction (see Sabaté in this issue).
The second is the union-led mobilizations of workers and the entire community demanding employment in the context of continued job loss in the area.
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Ferrol is a city of some 75,000 inhabitants located in the north-western coast of the Spanish region of Galicia, in the province of A Coruña. It has been home to military shipyards since the 18 th century and has developed a strong union culture at least since the end of the 19 th century. By the 1970s some 15,000 people worked in the main shipyards or in the auxiliary contract companies. Shipyard workers were heavily unionized, and work conditions and work pay defined them as privileged because they held secure jobs. Starting in the 1980s and following the general trend in Europe (Hudson and Sadler 1989; Beynon, Hudson and Sadler 1994 ) the shipyards were restructured and thousands of jobs were lost. This trend has continued until the present through various moments of re-structuring and job loss in the 1990s and 2000s.
Although the industry still provides 2,300 direct jobs, it has lost some 3,500 jobs since 2011, mostly in the contract firms.
The shipyard industry in Ferrol has become "flexible," relying on a network of subcontracted auxiliary firms that do not honour collective agreements. 3 This has gone hand in hand with the increase in unskilled and poorly paid service jobs and the feminization of the workforce, with 81% of women working in the service sector. 4 Overall, the region has experienced an increase of small and medium enterprises, many linked to construction, subcontracts or spin-offs from the shipyards, logistics and service sectors, in industrial parks surrounding the town of Ferrol. Today, the Ferrol area has over 30% unemployment, well above the national rate (Narotzky 2014 (Narotzky , 2015 that adds to precarity and population loss through migration. couple with two children if not their parents?" María and her husband were in the process of becoming the owners of a small apartment that they had purchased with a mortgage during the housing bubble years preceding the crisis. Although she never had a permanent job, she was able to get precarious employment until the crisis hit, while her husband was self-employed as a sales representative. The loss of their jobs began a process that she defines as a return to dependency ties with her parents, a process that negated the desired autonomy of adult citizenship. She secured housing for her small family because of her parents' sense of responsibility towards their daughter and grandchildren, but the tensions of dependency strained her marriage, which eventually broke up. She speaks of the pressure it put on her parents' lives and retirement pensions and she wonders how this family solidarity will be possible if the government approves the pension reform, and adds, "I will never have a pension… I will never be able to do
The double bind of dependency
for my children what my parents are doing for me."
María has become an activist in alternative provisioning networks and participates in a local cooperative that recycles used clothes (Tenda de troco, Barter shop) and provides them free through a system of accounting that registers points for the clothes one brings, the condition of the items, and the help one provides in mending and cleaning those in bad condition. She also participates in a free food distribution process that takes place twice a week: food is collected from local donors (mostly small shops in the market or ordinary people who still have a job) and redistributed to those who need it and request it. In return they are asked to participate and join the cooperative and their alternative project: to give as well as take help. The main political argument for mobilization, here, is a form of mutual obligation based on shared humanity and on an often vague and allegedly self-evident definition of the "common good", rather than on an explicit "social contract". Activism is justified as resulting from a moral critique of the collusion of state and capital in depriving people from their dignity and, thus, from their humanity. Although material expressions of deprivation and dispossession are acknowledged (e.g. lack of jobs, income, housing, savings, public services) the state is viewed as the main culprit for failing in its mandate to protect citizens while protecting "banks" and corrupt elites instead. The "system", as Intersindical Galega (CIG), which has a discourse of re-territorializing the economy, pushing local employers to assume responsibility for local workers as a nation-building coalition.
Memory of the historical gains that the working class accomplished through union struggles is still present, albeit perceived as an ambiguous heritage. For many, the gains in rights and wellbeing that resulted from struggles in the 1960s and 1970s were betrayed in the neo-corporatist agreements of the 1980s, a conciliatory position that continues to this day (Narotzky 2014 re-structuring in the 1980s, spoke of the "militant-citizen" that needs to emerge and made an appeal to occupy the city streets and squares. He spoke of the younger generations without work and living on their parents' retirement pensions, and pointed to the fact that these pensions will be disappearing in the near future as this older generation dies out. He also echoed María's conspiratorial reading of the present crisis when he asserted: "The neoliberal Right is not getting it wrong. Their politics are deliberately pursued as part of a very clear strategy. Therefore, thinking that they are getting it wrong is a mistake. (…) and they will continue until they have emptied the conquests of the working class of all content. The goal of the Right, but not only in Spain, at a worldwide level is… there is a strategy (…) there is a perfectly organized design. They want to do away with all the conquests that we had achieved until now.
They want us to move back to the 1920s." Juan went on to explain the conquests that are being attacked through austerity and covert privatization. These conquests are not those related to wages or labour conditions, but social conquests: public provisioning of quality health care, education and public services. For Juan and many of his peers, austerity measures are the organized dispossession of something that was not there to begin with but was produced (and achieved) as a form of common good through workers' collective struggles in the past. This was a struggle to produce the commons that are now being enclosed.
Struggles, therefore, define the boundaries and content of the common good and must be waged incessantly. His appeal to struggle is poignant: "The only way to change this situation is to occupy squares, occupy streets. We need to get to work, each one of us 12 needs to become a militant-citizen. We cannot remain passive… if we don't do it for ourselves, let's do it for our children, for future generations (…) Citizens are starting to rebel and this rebellion has to spread like an oil spill (…) because if we do not occupy the squares, the far right will occupy them, compañeros, it [the far right] is already shaping a discourse that resembles that of a real Left but what they are doing is confusing people, and they are winning battles. Compañeros, liberties are at stake, democracy is at stake, everything is at stake! But not for everyone, everything is at stake for a part of the citizenry, for the social majority… Therefore we need to fight with our own weapons. That is all, compañeros".
These marches for dignity are organized explicitly as a separate movement from the major national unions (CCOO, UGT), but they are defined as "of workers" and consider
citizens-as-workers (beyond the employed/unemployed divide) (Carbonella and Kasmir 2014). They are led by smaller unions (CUT, SAT, CGT, CNT), smaller parties (in
Galicia, Esquerda Unida-EU and Anova supported the first march), neighbourhood associations, as well as participants in the "mareas" (Marea Blanca, Marea Verde).
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They present themselves as a grassroots workers' movement and do not want to be instrumentalized by the big unions, as they explicitly pointed out in their second big mobilization in November 2014. 
Inequality, injustice, dignity
What do these mobilizations tell us? The first mobilization is a grassroots movement that stems from the need to organize support in the wake of unemployment, foreclosure, and cuts to social services and subsidies. It focuses on the state's failure to guarantee the basic material and social elements of a livelihood within the present "system": food,
shelter, work and respect. The second form of mobilization follows a more classic pattern of working class mobilization, focused on retaining jobs and social benefits in the face of industrial restructuring, the crisis and austerity. But it converges with the "tides" and "marches for dignity" that focus on the attack against public goods (through privatization and welfare adjustment cuts) and on the dispossession of basic rights: Pan, trabajo y techo (Bread, Work and a Roof) which are in fact included as rights in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Both movements underline "dignity" as the central claim that encapsulates the limits beyond which the "system" becomes intolerable. The concept of dignity appears as a summary of grievances, both material and social, which addresses the breach of the democratic social contract as it was understood by citizenworkers: as the result of struggles that had tamed capital's greed and ruthlessness, in a context of nominal human equality (Polanyi's double movement, 20 1971 ). Both analyze 14 the situation as the consequence of an increasing collusion of the state with capitalist interests.
The appeal to moral arguments such as dignity or injustice points to the feeling that the grounds on which certain principles of inequality were tolerated are no longer there (Scott 1976 (Scott , 1985 Moore 1978; Thompson 1971 Thompson , 1993 . Indeed, the Keynesian pact of growth, redistribution and inclusion was based on the expansion of productive capital, employment, consumption and social benefits. 21 Inequality in economic terms could be accepted as long as nominal equality in political terms (liberal democracy) appeared as a limiting factor to the excesses of political and economic elites. 22 Therefore "injustice"
points at the breakdown of the expectations that the "system" had pledged to provide.
The breakdown of the Keynesian pact has pushed the abandoned European masses to the realization that they are not being treated as equals in the basic, human, enlightened sense of the concept (a realization that was always present for colonial subjects).
Therefore the contradiction between the principle of freedom and equality as basic human rights and the reality of inequalities of distribution has become blatant. Indeed, an expanding form of capitalism based on monopoly rents, that is, on privilege and political force rather than on competitive markets, is becoming as obvious now in the core industrial nations as it was in the colonies and the global South for a long time. The forced aspect of the alleged "freedom" of contract at the base of the labour / capital relationship is compounded with the deceitful aspect of "equality" before the Law of alleged liberal democracies as impunity looms large for the rich and powerful while taxes, sanctions and punishment increase for the ordinary citizens and the poor.
Inequality and injustice are substantially different concepts although they often appear as pairs. As Dumont (1977) among others has exposed, the concept of equality comes with individualism and the notion of universal humanity, and appears historically as a 15 weapon of the bourgeoisie against unearned privilege. It becomes entrenched as equality of opportunity and supports private property as the extension of this ontological equality (of being individual humans) into social being: as a produced inequality attached to personal effort (not privilege) (Locke 1984; Rousseau 1965; Weber 1979) . Therefore, in the liberal moral economy, inequality appears as individually earned, the result of effort, and is deemed legitimate insofar as general progress is supposed to benefit all, however unequally.
In its historical adoption by the working class, "equality" has (often although not always) been radicalized through the attack on the legitimacy of private property as an extension of human equality. Fighting inequality then addresses equal distribution of the means of producing a livelihood; as Engels pointed out in his Anti-Düring, "the real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the abolition of classes" (1877). By this he meant the abolition of the capital-labour relation predicated on the unequal ownership of the means of production. Over centuries of struggle to achieve this kind of equality, many options have been pursued with mixed success. In present debates about inequality, redistribution of wealth through taxation and provisioning of public goods together with limits to "excess" returns on effort expended (e.g. management bonuses) stop very far from any consideration of structurally transforming the actual distribution of the means to produce a livelihood (Stiglitz 2012; Picketty 2014; Wade 2014) .
Injustice is a different matter altogether. If we think of equality as a modern invention, injustice is, to say the least, a pre-modern concept that harks back to Aristotle and Aquinas (some think it is a universal, ahistorical concept, e.g. Moore 1978) . Injustice is so interesting because it is inescapably a political concept. Justice refers to social reproduction in its broader sense of enabling the continuity of social life, that is, the continuity of human relations and complex dynamics in a political community 16 (Aristóteles 1985) . Justice, here, is not about measuring individuals against each other, about rendering them equal because they are commensurable in their identical humanity. Justice is about understanding the geometries of difference that make life in common possible. This is the "common good" which is the objective of the political, a political based on the articulation of differences that are permanently re-negotiated, stabilized and challenged (Bourdieu 1982 (Bourdieu , 1986a (Bourdieu , 1986b . Accepted principles of inequality form the basis upon which expected obligations tie people to each other into producing a "common good", the reproduction of political society. Simultaneously, however, the embedding of these principles of inequality in cultural obligations produces a hegemony that conceals domination and exploitation while favouring consent (Gramsci 1987; Bourdieu 1980 ). In the everyday, justice is mostly a procedure that redresses tort for the common good, enabling life in society to go on. But when cries of injustice become collective they point to systematic abuse. They point to the breakdown of the reciprocal obligations between unequal groups in society, and challenge the hitherto accepted principles of inequality that supported a particular idea of the "common good". E.P. Thompson (1971) (1958:184) asserts: "In the early fourteenth century, it becomes a commonplace in political and didactic prose and poetry that only by placing common welfare above private interest can internal peace, economic prosperity and political power be secured and preserved; so does the view that neglect of the common good leads to civic strife and the decline and fall of cities." Therefore "the common good must be raised to the position of the ruler" while it also gets to represent the Commune (1958:185) . In the Allegory of Bad Government, neglect of Justice and the common good brings Tyranny and social disaster. Therefore, justice as a moral political virtue is pre-modern and is not directly tied to a modernist understanding of equality but to pursuing the common good and avoiding havoc. It refers even less to a class-based understanding of equality; but moral indignation is a symptom. Here we need to unpack the tension between injustice and inequality in present-day mobilizations, and "dignity" provides the lynchpin.
Dignity expresses social worth; it asserts the value of the person in a particular structure of social reproduction. Whatever the position of the person in the geometries of power and wealth, dignity confirms that they have social value, that they are "equal" in their value for the common good. While this is a pre-modern claim, people's analyses of the causes that bring about their loss of dignity in present-day Ferrol point to the structure of a new form of capitalist accumulation that destroys the old (Fordist-Keynesian) principles of inequality within which worker-citizens had carved out a dignified position.
The financialization of accumulation in the present cycle has shifted the weight from surplus value to monopoly rent extraction on the one hand, and from value expansion through production to asset-price inflation, e.g. bubbles, on the other (Foster 2010; Many attempts at re-centring the economy in the national space appeal to a corporatist sense of responsibility within a clearly bounded territory. Some projects aimed at regaining dignity are framed in a competing process of creating privilege that would fend off deprivation at the expense of other under-privileged social groups. This is apparent in some forms of neo-nationalist projects that are exclusionary and xenophobic (Kalb and Halmi 2011; Ost 2015) . Other nationalist projects appear just as a demand for the state to care, a claim to proximate political responsibility that can be simultaneously viewed as a search for equality. What both kinds of projects have in common is an understanding that present-day political structures are not responsible towards them.
These forms of revolt result from the structures of financial accumulation and the new enclosures, that is, from the process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2004) .
Those who participate in them express moral indignation at the unjust consequences of these processes, and they perceive increased inequality and social polarization as the breakdown of the tacit agreement of liberal democracy. They understand inequality in moral terms, that is, in terms of injustice. They seek redress, at best, in the form of a return to the "statu quo ante", expressed in the short-lived European Social Market project that Spain joined late (and incompletely) or, at worst, in the creation of exclusionary spaces of privilege. Does this point to the kind of mobilizations described in Primitive Rebels (Hobsbawm 1965) ? Or is it the making of a new class attuned to the 21 present structure of capital accumulation (Thompson 1966 Although moral outrage is a powerful motive for mobilization, it needs to be directed at what causes inequality of access to the means that enable a worthy livelihood. This is different from addressing inequality of opportunity, which is itself a consequence.
Structural adjustment has unleashed contradictions between the political and economic aspects of capital accumulation that were latent for a long time. This is a creative moment when reconfiguration of class takes the form of debtor-creditor lines of struggle (Narotzky 2015) , and where alternative spaces of hope are flourishing in the gaps of debasement as a means of subsistence and a way to rebuild personal worth. It is also a moment when attempts to fight elite privilege with exclusionary privilege on the grounds of injustice show the dark face of other possible outcomes of resistance to the illiberal politico-economic reconfiguration.
I have witnessed the strength that the union organizations still hold in Ferrol. Their convergence with wide-ranging social movements is important because it pushes the struggle away from the shipyard and towards systemic social reproduction, attaching it to personal social reproduction. The convergence movement brings classical forms of organization, which are aware of the need to work up from the grassroots, together with the solidarity networks that want to break with the past in a more radical way, albeit in a non-systemic manner. The confluence of these two movements has the potential to bring forth a project that would articulate the aim at a structural transformation of the means to produce a livelihood with a strong ethics of care.
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However, the understanding of inequality in terms of injustice traps most people within a moral rather than a politico-economic framework for mobilization, one which is not predicated on class, that is, on the awareness of the structural positions within the unequal ownership of the means to reproduce a livelihood. Therefore, the question is the following: can moral economy struggles become structural challenges to systemic social reproduction through praxis, as Thompson (1966) proposed for the making of the "old" working class consciousness? From "moral economies" and "primitive rebels" to "political economies" and "class struggles", the tension between preserving the moral leverage of concrete injury and the political leverage of structural inequality has to be bridged. Meanwhile, this tension cannot be superseded: it must be retained in order to produce the real forces of change.
